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The ﬁrst aim of this paper is to revisit the puzzle of cooperation in large-scale societies. It proposes a
game theoretic model showing how endogenous emotion-based punishment can sustain full cooperation
when interactions are not repeated, provided that players' endogenous trust is high enough. The model
is extended to allow for players' heterogeneity, in which case multiple stable equilibria of cooperation
can coexist. The second aim of this paper is to explain how certain institutions may support trust and
cooperation in large societies. It builds on the example of a religious group and shows that costly religious
requirements may foster trust within a community, which in turn bolsters cooperation. When players
are heterogeneous, the model shows that religion may also serve as signalling device to exclude defectors.
Religion is thus shown to have a twofold role of trust coordination and signalling. This paper thus extends
the signalling theory of religion. Finally, the model enables clear and tractable predictions about the levels
of religious aﬃliationand participation within a society. Evidence of the model's implications is discussed.
JEL Codes: D02; D03; D71; D81; Z12.
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1 Introduction
The sustainability of cooperation in large-scale societies is puzzling. In such societies, most
interactions are not repeated, and reputational systems tend to break down due to individ-
uals' lack of information on their peers' history. Standard economic models predict in these
contexts that cooperation, an individually costly but socially beneﬁcial behaviour, cannot
form a dominant strategy for rational agents. Standard theory has thus proven limited to
account for humans' capacity to engage in durable cooperative relationships on a large scale.
The primary aim of this paper is to revisit the puzzle of cooperation in large-scale societies. It
proposes a game theoretic model showing how endogenous, costly rational punishment can
sustain cooperation when interactions are not repeated, provided that players' endogenous
trust is high enough. Costly punishment has been widely and reliably found to be central to
the sustainability of cooperation in experimental settings (Gächter et al., 2010; Henrich et al.,
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2006; Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002) and in ethnographic accounts (Henrich et al., 2010), even
in one-shot interactions. Theoretical work has also shown that the altruistic punishment of
defectors can proliferate and sustain cooperation in large populations (Henrich, 2004; Boyd
et al., 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Models of altruistic punishment have however typically
overlooked agents' rational motivations to punish defectors as they simply assume that the
taste to punish is intrinsic to (some) agents' preferences. This approach ignores important
facets of agents' decision to punish and the mechanisms underlying it (e.g. negative emotions;
see e.g. Falk et al., 2005; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In particular, evidence suggests that trust
is key to agents' adherence to cooperative norms and readiness to punish defection, which
contributes to explain why levels of cooperativeness vary across communities (Balliet and
Van Lange, 2013; Fischbacher et al., 2001). To my knowledge, no attempt has been made to
analyse theoretically the relationship between trust and punishment and their joint role in
supporting cooperation.
The model introduced in this paper is based on three stylized facts emerging from experi-
mental economics, game theory, psychology and evolutionary biology:
Stylized Fact A. Cooperative norms are enforced and upheld by the punishment
of defectors;
Stylized Fact B . Punishment arises primarily from negative emotions, which
make cooperators willing to sacriﬁce their own material well-being to reduce the
well-being of defectors;
Stylized Fact C . Negative emotions are prompted primarily by disappointed ex-
pectations, which depend on outcomes and players' beliefs.
The benchmark model features a continuum of homogeneous players who are pairwise matched
in a one-shot prisoners' dilemma. Unlike the canonical prisoners' dilemma, players have, in
addition to their material payoﬀs, belief-based social preferences interpreted as negative emo-
tions when they are cheated on. Indeed, when a cooperator i is matched with a defector
j, j's utility enters negatively into i's utility. A cooperator matched with a defector is thus
willing to punish her partner even if punishment is costly (Fact B), which is made possible
in a second and last stage of the game. The intensity of cooperators' negative emotions is
increasing in their expectations about the proportion of cooperators in the population: the
more they trust their coplayers, the more intense their negative emotions when they are
cheated on (Fact C). The model shows that emotion-based punishment can sustain full coop-
eration at equilibrium, although full defection is also always an equilibrium (Fact A). I then
extend the model to allow for heterogeneity in the form of an additional, individual-speciﬁc
cost of cooperation. I show that multiple interior stable equilibria of trust and cooperation
can be sustained in a population, even though full defection is again always an equilibrium.
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The second aim of this paper is to explain how certain institutions, such as religious organi-
sations, may have helped towards, or been necessary to, the achievement of higher trust and
cooperation in large societies1. To do so, I build on the example of a religious group. I as-
sume that any one player can form such a group and tie its membership to an observable and
costly signal (e.g. costly religious requirements). Players thereafter play the game as in the
benchmark model. It is shown that if religious requirements are costly enough, they permit
the coordination of players' trust as players know that if their coreligionists did not intend
to cooperate, they would not partake in the religious group. This makes full cooperation an
equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. Hence, if the optimal requirements are not too
costly in comparison to the beneﬁts of cooperation, a religious group arises endogenously
and ensures the coordination of players' expectations and the realisation of full cooperation.
Finally, I show that when players are heterogeneous, then a religious group may also serve
as a signalling device to exclude those who would never cooperate. In such case, a religious
group plays a twofold role (signalling and coordination), necessary for cooperation to be
achievable. In that respect, my model extends the signalling theory of religion (e.g. Levy
and Razin, 2012, forthcoming; Berman, 2000; Iannacconne, 1992, 1994).
Lastly, the model enables clear and tractable predictions about the levels of religious aﬃliation
(the proportion of players partaking in the religious group) and religious participation (the
intensity of religious practice) within a society. It thus proposes a theory of the factors
inﬂuencing the size of religion in a society. It shows notably that increasing beneﬁts of
cooperation, decreasing beneﬁts of defection or decreasing cost of punishment all entail an
increase in religious aﬃliation and a decrease in religious participation (and vice-versa).
Evidence supporting the implications of the model is discussed.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows. As the three stylized facts underpinning the
model are central to the arguments of this paper, I devote the next section to reviewing the
literature and evidence on which they rest. In the third section, I introduce and develop
the benchmark model. I discuss its implications and how it relates to the existing literature.
In the fourth section, I allow players to partake in a religious group. I analyse how such
possibility changes the results of the model, and how these results relate to existing ﬁndings
in the literature. The ﬁfth section discusses some of the predictions of the model in terms of
religious aﬃliation and participation within a society. The sixth section concludes.
1It is commonly accepted that the evolution of large-scale societies required norms and institutions that sustain fairness in
ephemeral exchanges (Henrich et al., 2010: 1481; italics added), and a dominant view in sociology and evolutionary anthropology
regards religion as one of these institutions (Henrich et al., 2010; Norenzayan and Shariﬀ, 2008; Bulbulia et al., 2008).
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2 Stylized Facts: Punishment, Emotions and Cooperation
2.1 Stylized Fact A: Cooperative norms are enforced and upheld by the pun-
ishment of defectors
Costly punishment has been widely and reliably found to be central to the sustainability of
cooperation in experimental settings (Gächter et al., 2010; Henrich et al., 2006; Fehr and
Gächter, 2000, 2002) and in ethnographic accounts (Henrich et al., 2010), even in one-shot
interactions. It is also regarded as central to the evolution of cooperation (Boyd et al. 2010;
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Boyd et al., 2003).
In economics, the theory of repeated games has widely been used to account for costly pun-
ishment and cooperation in situations where they seem a priori inconsistent with selﬁsh
behaviour (see e.g. Kandori, 1992; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). Simply put, this theory
contends that suﬃciently patient players may at equilibrium choose strategies that credibly
deter their coplayers from deviating from the cooperative behaviour.2 Kandori's (1992) sem-
inal paper on informal community enforcement uses this approach. In his model, agents are
randomly pair-wise matched at every period and cooperate until they are matched with a
defector, after which they defect forever.3 Hence, if players are suﬃciently patient, they have
a strong incentive to cooperate since a single defection, in the long run, induces the complete
unravelling of cooperation within the community.
The repeated game approach nevertheless suﬀers empirical shortcomings. First, it cannot
account for many stylized facts characterizing punishment and cooperation enforcement (see
Sobel, 2005, for an extensive presentation of this argument). In particular, it falls short of
explaining punishment in large groups where players interact with people they will never
meet again, and where reputation gains are small or absent (Fehr and Gächter, 2002: 137).
Punishment in such contexts is yet well evidenced. In fact, Henrich and colleagues' (2010) ex-
perimental ﬁndings across diﬀerent societies support the argument that punishment becomes
more important in large groups: as reputational systems break down in larger populations,
increasing levels of diﬀuse costly punishment are required to sustain large harmonious com-
munities (2010: 1483; italics added).
2Alternatively, in n-players settings, players may want to cooperate to build a reputation of cooperation and thus induce
their coplayers to cooperate with them. Reputation-based models operate slightly diﬀerently as some learning takes place but
rest on the same general intuition (see Sobel, 2005, for a review).
3Punishment is thus undirected in Kandori's approach: a cooperator matched with a defector responds by defecting thereafter,
which punishes all players including cooperators. In my model, punishment is directed only at defectors after their defection,
while players' decision to cooperate or not depends only on their expectations about all other players' propensity to cooperate.
This formulation is more tightly linked to the voluminous empirical literature regarding both punishment and conditional
cooperation (see e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001).
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2.2 Stylized Fact B: Punishment arises primarily from negative emotions, which
make cooperators willing to sacriﬁce their own material well-being to reduce
the well-being of defectors
Defection in public good games or oﬀers perceived as unfair or derisory in ultimatum, dictator
or trust games, to name a few examples, trigger strong negative emotions that have been
shown to motivate players to punish selﬁsh players and defectors, even if punishment is
materially costly (Falk et al., 2005; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002). In
fact, a reliable ﬁnding in experimental economics and psychology is that anger and related
negative emotions are the best predictors of one's decision to punish, even when punishment
is costly (see e.g. Roberts et al., 2013; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009).4 De Quervin and
colleagues (2004) even ﬁnd that punishment, although stemming from negative emotions,
can be intrinsically pleasurable (c.f. Huettel and Kranton, 2012). Anger is also viewed as
having had a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation through punishment (Jensen,
2010; Fessler, 2010).
The most straightforward way to incorporate individuals' negative emotions and emotion-
based punishment in a formal framework is to assume that agents hold negative other-
regarding preferences when they are cheated on (see e.g. Falk and Fischbacher, 2005,
2006; Falk et al., 2005, 2008; Rabin, 1993). Models or intrinsic reciprocity or interdepen-
dent preferences provide clearer and more intuitive explanations for costly punishment and
cooperation than models that abstract from emotions (Sobel, 2005; 393). These models typ-
ically adopt a utility function of the form ui (si, sj) = pii (si, sj) + aij (si, sj) · pij (sj, si) for
any player i with coplayer j, where pii and pij are respectively i's and j's material payoﬀs,
si and sj are respectively i's and j's chosen strategies, and aij (.) is the social preferences
weight , that is the weight i attaches to j's material payoﬀs (see Sobel, 2005, for a review).
The speciﬁc form of aij (.) depends on the emotion or nature of the social preference at play.
In the context of cooperation enforcement and emotion-based punishment, it is natural to
conceive of aij (.) as reﬂecting the intensity of i's negative emotions vis-à-vis j when the latter
defects.
2.3 Stylized Fact C: Negative emotions are prompted primarily by disappointed
expectations, which depend on outcomes and players' beliefs
The third stylized fact states that the magnitude and sign of one's emotions vis-à-vis someone
else's actions depend on one's ex ante expectations about one's payoﬀs.5 Empirical evidence
4Interestingly, Roberts et al. (2013) recently found that when controlled for anger, players' willingness to punish defectors
in public good games remained unaﬀected by the probability of future interaction. This provides further evidence that the
repeated games theory fails to account for mechanisms that appear central to cooperation and cooperation enforcement.
5In particular, this implies that individuals' incentives to enforce cooperative norms depend on their expectations about how
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underpinning this fact is abundant. Bosman and van Winden (2002), Bosman et al. (2005)
and Reuben and van Winden (2008), in a series of experiments of power-to-take games
(PTTGs),6 ﬁnd that receivers' expectations regarding proposers' take rate predict their level
of anger (and punishment through destruction of their endowments) far more accurately then
their opinion about the fair take rate. In the same vein, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) show experimentally that players strive to avoid guilt,
which is an increasing function of players' expectations about their coplayer's expectations. In
other words, they show that players display a desire to live up to their coplayer's expectations
and the higher they perceive these expectations to be, the higher their guilt when they
fail. A natural explanation is that players anticipate their coplayer's negative emotions (e.g.
disappointment and anger) to be higher when they think she expects more.
The modelling of belief-dependent preferences and emotions lends itself well to psychological
games (PGs), which allow players' utility to depend on their beliefs as well as on their
material payoﬀs. Rabin (1993) pioneered the application of PGs with a model of intent-
based reciprocity in which he adopts a utility function of the form ui (si, sj) = pii (si, sj) +
aij (si, sj) · pij (sj, si), introduced earlier, but allows the social preferences weight aij (.)
to vary with players' ex ante expectations. In his model, player i values positively player
j's utility if i believes that j behaved kindly, and vice-versa. In turn, player i is more
disposed to positive reciprocity if she believes that player j behaved kindly, and vice-versa.7
To model anger and anger-based punishment, I adapt Smith's (2009) psychological game
model of frustrated anger. Smith uses a utility function similar in spirit to that used by
Rabin. His speciﬁcation of aij (.), when translated to a one-shot non-sequential game, takes
the form max {0, pii,0 − pi∗i (si, sj)}, where pii,0 is player i' ex ante expected material payoﬀs
and pi∗i (si, sj) is i's realised material payoﬀs resulting from i's and j's actions. Hence, higher
expectations lead to greater intensity of anger when expectations are not met. I adopt the
same speciﬁcation but, in addition, allow cooperators who have been cheated on (i.e. players
for whom aij (.) < 0) to directly inﬂict, at a certain cost, a punishment on their coplayer in
a second stage.8
much these norms are actually observed by their peers. When a norm is well observed, expectations are high, and deviations
will typically trigger strong nevative emotions. In other words, violations of social norms do not make us angry if we are used
to them (Dubreuil, 2010a: 217).
6In PTTGs, two players are given the same amount of money. One subject (proposer) is then allowed to take a fraction of
the second subject's (receiver) endowment. The receiver can destroy a fraction of her own endowment in order to punish the
proposer by reducing her/his payoﬀs (so doing, she also destroys the same fraction of her own ﬁnal payoﬀs).
7This believed kindness depends on the diﬀerence between i's expected payoﬀs from the outcome stemming from i and j's
actions and some focal payoﬀ. He assumes this focal payoﬀ to be the equitable payoﬀ, itself measured as an average of i's
highest and lowest possible payoﬀs.
8Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007, 2009) exploit an intuition very similar to Smith's. They assume that players derive
negative utility from guilt, which they feel if their actions fail to live up to a coplayer's expectations. Hence, the more player i
expects j to expect, the guiltier i will feel if she does not live up to j's expectations. As it will be shown, to allow players to
punish a coplayer directly in a second stage permits to incorporate both anger and guilt in the model. My model thus allows
incorporating the two approaches in a uniﬁed fashion in the context of a speciﬁc application.
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3 The Model
3.1 The Benchmark Model: Homogeneous Players
3.1.1 Players, Strategies and Payoﬀs
Consider a continuum of measure one of homogenous players who are pairwise randomly
matched in a prisoners' dilemma (PD) game. The one-shot nature of the game, the random
matching and the continuous population altogether enable the model to capture short-term
interactions. These interactions, as discussed earlier, are typical of large-scale societies.
Furthermore, in the context of punishment which is central to the model, bilateral interactions
permit a starker and clearer analysis of players' incentives. Many-player games such as public-
good games could nevertheless be analysed in the framework of the model.
The interactions modeled here have two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, players play the PD game.
In the second stage, players may punish their coplayer. Such punishment takes place because
players who cooperated in the ﬁrst stage display negative social preferences towards their
coplayer if the latter defected. Such negative social preferences spark a desire to alter a
coplayer's utility through punishment. I will now detail the two stages of the game.
First-stage strategies and payoﬀs. In the ﬁrst stage, players' set of possible strategies
is deﬁned as Si = Sj = {C, D} ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1], where C and D stand for cooperation and
defection, respectively. Players opting for C (D) are called cooperators (defectors). Let
pii : Si × Sj → R denote player i's material payoﬀs. Throughout, I shall use the notation
si ∈ Si and sj ∈ Sj to denote players i and j's chosen strategies. The material payoﬀs matrix
for player i is written as follows:
sj = C sj = D
si = C pic 0
si = D pid 0
(1)
with pid > pic > 0. Note that defection is thus materially weakly dominant. I assume
pii(si = D, sj = D) = pii(si = C, sj = D) = 0 only for simplicity and without altering the
intuition behind the results.
Social preferences . From the material game above, I derive a psychological game based on
the stylized facts (A), (B) and (C). I base players' utility function on the following equation,
introduced earlier:
ui (si, sj) = pii (si, sj) + aij (si, sj) · pij (sj, si) (2)
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I assume that a player i has negative social preferences towards her coplayer j only when
the latter cheats on her, i.e. when i cooperates while j defects.9 These negative social
preferences are interpreted as negative emotions (e.g. anger) towards a defecting coplayer.
Furthermore, as implied by the stylized fact (C), I assume that the magnitude of a coop-
erator's negative emotions towards a defecting coplayer depends on the former's ex ante
expectations. Hence, the higher the material payoﬀs a player expects ex ante, the higher the
negative emotions she will feel if her coplayer defects. To incorporate these assumptions into
a speciﬁcation of the social preferences weight, aij (.), consider the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1. Let qi ∈ [0, 1] denote player i's trust, which corresponds to i's ex ante belief
about the probability of being matched with a cooperator.
Using Deﬁnition 1, players ex ante expected material payoﬀs can be written asEi (pii (si, s˜j)) =
qi [pii (si, C)]+(1− qi) [pii (si, D)]. Let Q˜ (qi) denote player i's disappointed expectations, de-
ﬁned as the diﬀerence between i's ex ante expected material payoﬀs and realised payoﬀs.
Formally:
Q˜ (qi) ≡ Ei (pii (si, s˜j))− pii (si, sj) (3)
Using (3), the full speciﬁcation of the social preferences weight aij (.) can be written as
follows:
aij (si, sj, qi) ≡
−γQ˜ (qi) if si = C 6= sj0 otherwise (4)
with γ > 0, an exogenous parameter. This speciﬁcation neatly incorporates the stylized fact
(C) in that players' negative emotions, through their disappointed expectations, depend on
both outcomes and players' trust. In particular, the more a cooperator i trusts her coplayer
j, the higher will i's negative emotions be when j fails to cooperate. Likewise, the higher the
loss incurred on i by j's defection, the stronger will i's negative emotions be.
Using equations (2) and (4), players' utility after the ﬁrst stage of the game can be fully
written as follows:
ui (si, sj, qi) = pii (si, sj) + aij (si, sj, qi) · uj (5)
Second-stage strategies. A cooperator i can impose a punishment loss p on a defector j
at a cost c (p), with c′(.) > 0, c′′(.) > 0 and c(0) = 0. The set of possible strategies for players
in this second stage is deﬁned as Pi = Pj = R+. To understand players' incentive to punish,
9Rabin (1993) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) allow aij (.) to be positive when two players cooperate or are kind to each
other. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) and Smith (2009), in contrast, focus solely on negative emotions. Since I focus on the
role of negative emotions in punishment and the inclusion of positive reciprocity would change little to the general intuition
of this model, I opt for the latter approach.
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note that players i and j's utility functions, upon i being cheated on by j, can be written,
respectively, as:
ui (C, D, qi) = −γQ˜ (qi)uj (6)
uj (D, C, qj) = pid, ∀qj ∈ [0, 1] (7)
Incorporating player i's possibility to inﬂict a punishment loss of p > 0 on j at a cost c (p)
in the second stage and substituting (7) into (6), i's utility can be written as:
ui (C, D, qi) = −γQ˜ (qi) [pid − p]− c (p) (8)
As shown by equation (8), player i can clearly gain some utility by reducing j's utility through
punishment. Indeed, punishment reduces her negative emotions, −Q˜ (qi)uj, and can thus be
regarded as an anger-relief good that cooperators are willing to buy. This modeling thus
captures the stylized fact (B), stating that punishment arises from negative emotions making
people willing to sacriﬁce their own well-being to reduce the well-being of defectors.
Consider now the subgame starting after j cheated on i in the ﬁrst stage. Player i then solves




−γQ˜ (qi) [pid − p]− c (p)
}
(9)
This maximisation problem yields the following ﬁrst order necessary condition assuming an
interior equilibrium:
c′ (p∗) = γQ˜ (qi) (10)
which admits a unique interior equilibrium for i's punishment, denoted p∗ (qi). Note that since
aij (si, sj, qi) = 0 whenever the strategy proﬁle (si, sj) 6= (C, D), clearly only cooperators
matched with defectors will inﬂict a punishment loss on their coplayer.
Remark 1.
Cooperator i's optimal level of punishment on defector j is increasing in both i's trust, qi,
and i's material loss from j's defection, pic. It is also decreasing in the marginal cost of
punishment.
The proof to Remark 1 follows directly from the properties of the punishment cost function,
c(.). As noted earlier, the higher i's trust (qi) and the higher the payoﬀs to cooperation (pic),
the higher i's potential disappointed expectations (Q˜ (qi)), and the stronger i's negative emo-
tions when j defects. In turn, the stronger i's negative emotions, the stronger i's punishment
on j. Hence, a corollary of Remark 1 is that more trusting players punish defecting coplayers
more.
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Let us now consider players' ex ante expected utility value function,10 expressed as follows:
Ei [ui (si, s˜j, qi, q˜j)] = Ei [pii(si, s˜j)]− 1si=D 6=sj (Ei [p∗ (q˜j)])
−1si=C 6=sj
[
γQ˜ (qi) [pid − p∗ (qi)]− c [p∗ (qi)]
]
(11)
Equation (11) shows how player i's utility depends on (i) the material outcomes of the game;
(ii) i's trust or ex ante expectations; and (iii) i's expectations about j's level of trust. This
dependence on beliefs and second-order beliefs is a deﬁning characteristic of psychological
games.11 Incorporating this utility function into the normal-form game, the ﬁnal payoﬀs
matrix for player i is as follows:
sj = C sj = D
si = C pic −γQ˜ (qi) [pid − p∗ (qi)]− c [p∗ (qi)]
si = D pid − Ei [p∗ (q˜j)] 0
(12)
3.1.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Because the game described above forms a psychological game, I use the deﬁnition of psycho-
logical Nash equilibrium, imposing that all beliefs and higher-order beliefs about behaviour
conform to actual behaviour at equilibrium. Since payoﬀs are ex ante uncertain, I adapt this
deﬁnition to Bayesian games. Hereinafter, for simplicity, I shall refer to any solution of the
game as an equilibrium.










is an equilibrium if, ∀i and
s∗i 6= s′i, ∀s∗i , s′i ∈ Si:










)] ≥ Ei [ui (s′i, ˜s−i, p∗i , ˜p∗−i, qi, ˜q−i)];
3. qi = q−i = Ei ( ˜q−i) = E−i (q˜i) = q∗;
where q∗ corresponds to the actual proportion of cooperators in the population.
10This is a value function because the optimal punishment, which solves equation (10) for all players conditional on their level
of trust, is incorporated directly in players' utility.
11Note that the model permits to incorporate explicitly both Smith's (2009) modelling of frustrated anger and Battigali
and Dufwenberg's (2007) modelling of simple guilt, even though these authors focus on sequential games. Indeed, imposing
c (p) = 1
2
p2 generates the exact same negative psychological payoﬀs for players as those proposed in Smith's (2009) model of





if matched with a cooperator j. When this punishment cost is interpreted as guilt, it corresponds exactly
to Battigali and Dufwenberg's (2007) modelling of simple guilt.
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Deﬁnition 2 states that any equilibrium must form a subgame perfect equilibrium. Condi-
tional on players' beliefs and strategy in the ﬁrst stage, players' punishment strategies must
maximise their utility in the second stage. In turn, players' optimal strategy in the ﬁrst stage
must be consistent with backward induction and maximise their expected utility conditional
on their level of trust. This level of trust must be rational at equilibrium and correspond to
the actual probability of being matched with a cooperator.
Proposition 1.
Let p∗max denote a cooperator's optimal punishment when her level of trust is maximal (i.e.
when qi = 1).
1. If and only if the beneﬁts of cooperation are lower than the beneﬁts of defection when
cooperation is maximal (i.e. if and only ifpic < pid − p∗max), then there exists a unique
low equilibrium with q∗ = 0;
2. If and only if pic ≥ pid−p∗max, then there exists three equilibria, namely a low equilibrium
(q∗ = 0,), a high equilibrium (q∗ = 1), and an intermediate equilibrium (q∗ ∈ (0, 1)).
Proof . All proofs are given in the Appendices.
Figure 1 (a) presents a calibration generating a unique low equilibrium. Figure 1 (b) provides
an example of calibration with multiple equilibria. The curves represent the expected payoﬀs
(vertical axis) of cooperation and defection as a function of q, the proportion of cooperators,
which correspond to players' trust level at equilibrium. Graphically, an equilibrium obtains
when the curve of expected payoﬀs from cooperation crosses the curve of expected payoﬀs
from defection (except for the possible corner solution of full cooperation).
As illustrated on the graphs, a direct implication of Proposition 1 is that the game always
displays a low equilibrium, that is an equilibrium characterised by full defection, no trust
and no punishment. This result is intuitive. Suppose that all players expect full defection,
and expect all other players to expect full defection too. Then, players' payoﬀs consist
solely of material payoﬀs as psychological payoﬀs are equal to zero. Full defection is then an
equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
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Figure 1: Trust-based Equilibria
However, Proposition 1 also shows how the model captures the stylized fact (A), stating
that punishment of anti-cooperative behaviour can make cooperation prevail. If punishing
defectors is suﬃciently cheap (i.e. if p∗max is suﬃciently high), the model displays an eﬃcient,
Pareto-optimal high equilibrium characterised by full cooperation, full trust and maximal
(latent) punishment. Indeed, suppose that all players expect full cooperation, and expect all
other players to expect the same. If pic > pid−p∗max, then clearly the ex ante expected payoﬀs
from cooperation are greater than the ex ante expected payoﬀs from defection, entailing
that all players are then actually better oﬀ cooperating. This in turn rationalises players'
expectations and makes full cooperation an equilibrium.
12
The third intermediate equilibrium lends itself to diﬀerent possible interpretations. Let
qˆ ∈ (0, 1) denote the proportion of cooperators at such an equilibrium. First, since players are
homogenous, qˆ represents the probability of any player choosing cooperation in a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium. Second, qˆ also represents the minimal trust level for a player to
choose cooperation as a pure strategy. In that respect, qˆ reﬂects the attraction power of the
low equilibrium. Indeed, consider the following remark.
Remark 2. Suppose that the game is played a ﬁnite number of times .12 Suppose that players'
initial trust is exogenous. Suppose ﬁnally that players update their trust level after observing
the outcome of the game at the ﬁrst period ;13 formally, suppose that qi,t = qj,t = qt−1, ∀t > 1
and ∀i, j, where qt denotes the proportion of cooperators at period t. Then, a proportion of
players of at least qˆ must have an initial level of trust of at least qˆ for the high equilibrium
to be achieved in the second period and in every subsequent period.
Remark 2 states that if the game is adapted to this simple dynamic setting, then qˆ can be
seen as the basin of attraction of the low equilibrium. The higher qˆ, the higher players' initial
trust must be for cooperation to be sustainable dynamically. In that respect, Proposition
1 and Remark 2 highlight the potential self-fulﬁlling dimension of trust. Ceteris paribus,
when trust is low, players tend to prefer defection to cooperation, which incidentally justiﬁes
the low level of trust. The opposite holds true too.
3.2 Heterogeneous Population
In this subsection, I relax the assumption of players' homogeneity. This assumption is strin-
gent notably because the opportunity cost and/or the beneﬁts of cooperation may vary across
the population. There are at least three main reasons to think so:
1. Some individuals are naturally more inclined towards cooperation than others. For
instance, if some individuals believe that cooperative behaviours are rewarded in the
after-life while others don't, ceteris paribus , it is reasonable to expect the former to be
more prone to cooperate than the latter;
2. What constitutes cooperation and how it should be performed is context-speciﬁc. Indi-
viduals may learn this information at diﬀerent costs. For instance, what constitutes a
fair trade practice may vary across trading parties from diﬀerent cultural or religious
12Note that for ﬁnitely repeated games, Proposition 1 holds at every period.
13This beliefs updating rule is deliberately simplistic and is only instrumental in expressing the intuition that the higher qˆ,
the more trustful players will have to be to coordinate on the high equilibrium. Of course, more complex and realistic beliefs
updating rules could be designed; this is however not the purpose of this discussion.
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backgrounds. This may hinder cooperation between socially distant traders (see e.g.
Leeson, 2008; Leeson and Coyne, 2012);
3. Cooperation may serve the interests of some individuals in particular within a society.
In other words, some individuals may beneﬁt more than others from cooperation.
The simplest way to capture this heterogeneity is to assume the presence of an additional, het-
erogeneous cost to cooperation for each player. Assume that this cost, denoted τi ∈ [0, τmax],
is private information and drawn according to a continuous, twice-diﬀerentiable distribution
function with cumulative distribution denoted Φ : [0, τmax] → [0, 1].14 The ﬁnal payoﬀs
matrix for player i (12) can be modiﬁed as follows to account for players' heterogeneity:
sj = C sj = D
si = C pic − τi −γQ˜i (qi) [pid − p∗ (qi)]− c [p∗ (qi)]− τi
si = D pid − Ei [p∗ (q˜j)] 0
(13)
Note that Q˜ (qi), player i's disappointed expectations, remains unaﬀected by τi. Optimal
punishment thus also remains unchanged. Finally, the deﬁnition of equilibrium remains the
same, with the exception that players' expected utility now displays the additional argument
τi.
Proposition 1* is analogous to Proposition 1 but generalises it to account for players' indi-
vidual cost of cooperation.
Proposition 1*.
1. If and only if Φ is weakly convex and:
(a) pic − τmax < pid − p∗max, then there exists a unique low equilibrium characterised by
full defection (i.e. q∗ = 0);15
14In the literature on this economics of religion, this cost is usually taken as reﬂecting players' individual religiosity or beliefs
in after-life rewards or punishments, which in turn inﬂuence their individual cooperativeness. Note that I consider only cases
with τi ≥ 0. Hence, the individual cost to cooperation is always a cost, strictly speaking. I do not consider cases where faith
would, for instance, instill beliefs of supranatural rewards in case of cooperation, which would translate into additional positive
payoﬀs to cooperation. The implicit assumption here is that even players with stronger religious beliefs (and thus with lower τi)
require some cooperation enforcement to opt for cooperation. In contrast, Levy and Razin (forthcoming, 2012) consider in their
models that religiosity per se is suﬃcient to induce certain players to cooperate. Such assumption, which in my model would
amount to the inequality pic − τi > pid for some τi, would prevent the realisation of a low equilibrium.
15As explained in the Appendices, it is possible to have 3 equilibria (one low equilibrium and two intermediate equilibria) with
this condition when pid − p∗max < 0 for some q. However, the resulting higher intermediate equilibrium always yields negative
payoﬀs to all players. Such an equilibrium is not very interesting. In particular, to impose pid − p∗max ≥ 0 suﬃcient to ensure
that this condition yields a unique low equilibrium.
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(b) pic − τmax ≥ pid − p∗max, then there exists three equilibria, namely a low equilibrium
(q∗ = 0,), a high equilibrium (q∗ = 1), and an intermediate equilibrium (q∗ ∈ (0, 1)).
2. If Φ is not weakly convex and:
(a) pic−τmax < pid−p∗max, then there exists one low equilibrium (q∗ = 0), never displays a
high equilibrium (q∗ = 1) but may display an even number of intermediate equilibria
(q∗ ∈ (0, 1));
(b) pic − τmax ≥ pid − p∗max, then there exists at least 3 equilibria, namely one low equi-
librium (q∗ = 0,), one high equilibrium (q∗ = 1), and one intermediate equilibrium
(q∗ ∈ (0, 1)).
Equilibria when Φ is weakly convex and not weakly convex are illustrated on Figures 2 (a)
and (b), respectively. The two graphs plot (i) the curve of expected payoﬀs from coopera-
tion with homogeneous players; (ii) the curve of expected payoﬀs from defection; and (iii)
the curve of expected payoﬀs from cooperation for the qth player when players are ordered
in increasing order of individual cost of cooperation (τi). Curve (iii) is constructed by sub-
tracting Φ−1 (.) from curve (i).With heterogeneous players, an equilibrium occurs whenever
curve (ii) crosses curve (iii).
Proposition 1* states that when Φ is weakly convex, Proposition 1 holds with a minor change
to the condition for the existence of a high and an intermediate equilibria (the condition must
hold for the player with the highest τi). Graphically, curves (ii) and (iii) have then a similar
shape. When Φ is not weakly convex, however, results may change substantially. Stable,
interior equilibria may exist as shown by point E∗ on Figure 2 (b). At equilibrium E∗, a
fraction q∗E of players (those with the lowest individual cooperation cost) cooperate, while
the rest defect. Finally, little else can be said without a more speciﬁed form for Φ when
it is not weakly convex, except that a low equilibrium again always exist and that a high
equilibrium exists whenever cooperation is more proﬁtable than defection for the individual
with the highest individual cooperation cost when q = 1 (i.e. when pic − τmax > pid − p∗max).
3.3 Discussion: Trust, Punishment and Cooperation
This paper relates to the literature on the enforcement of cooperative norms in large scale
societies. In particular, it is closely linked to the theoretical work in evolutionary game
theory investigating the role of altruistic punishment in cooperation (Henrich, 2004; Boyd
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Figure 2: Equilibria with Heterogeneous Players
et al., 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 2002). These models typically build on a cooperative game
(e.g. prisoners' dilemma, public good game) played by diﬀerent types of players, namely
selﬁsh players, cooperative players and cooperative altruistic punishers. In absence of
the latter, selﬁsh players always enjoy greater payoﬀs than cooperative players. Since players
with higher ﬁtness (measured by payoﬀs) reproduce more, the selﬁsh player type thus takes
over the whole population in the long run. However, the appearance of altruistic punishers
in the population can change the structure of payoﬀs in favor of cooperators. Indeed, if
punishment incurs high enough costs on defectors, then selﬁsh players' ﬁtness falls below
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that of cooperators. The proportion of cooperators increases over time as a result, which
in turn fosters altruistic punishers' ﬁtness relative to selﬁsh players. Hence, under certain
parametric conditions, these models show that an altruistic punisher type can proliferate and
sustain cooperation in large populations where interactions are not repeated.
Models of altruistic punishment typically overlook agents' rational motivations to punish
defectors as they simply assume that the taste to punish is intrinsic to (some) agents' pref-
erences16. Indeed, altruistic punishers are deemed to be biologically wired to punish selﬁsh
players. They are truly altruistic in that they passively accept to bear the costs of a public
good (punishment) while not individually beneﬁting from it. Hence, the altruistic punish-
ment approach is diﬃcult to conciliate with rational behaviour. In particular, it ignores
important facets of agents' decision to punish and the mechanisms underlying it, such as
negative emotions and trust.
This paper reconciles costly punishment in one-shot interactions with rational behaviour. It
introduces a model where agents may punish their coplayer to reduce the negative emotions
they feel upon being cheated on. The intensity of cooperators' negative emotions is increas-
ing in their expectations about the proportion of cooperators in the population: the more
they trust their coplayers, the more intense their negative emotions when they are cheated
on, and the harder they punish. At equilibrium, cooperation can be sustained by players'
expectations (trust), which ensure a level of cooperation enforcement (punishment) large
enough for players to opt for cooperation.
A direct implication of the model is that punishment, trust and cooperation should in general
be positively correlated. In this regard, Balliet and Van Lange (2013) present a quantitative
meta-analysis of 83 studies in 18 diﬀerent societies bearing on the links between cooperation,
trust and punishment. They deﬁne trust as individuals' beliefs about others' benevolence
and propensity to cooperate (e.g. contribute to a public good, cooperate in prisoners'
dilemma), which is in direct line with the deﬁnition of trust oﬀered in Deﬁnition 1. They
report empirical evidence strongly supporting the implications of the model:
[T]he present ﬁndings unpack the puzzle of punishment even further by providing
novel support for the perspective that societal levels of trust and the enforcement
of social norms are mutually reinforcing. . . The present research provides evidence
that eﬀective norm enforcement for cooperative behavior, which results in greater
16Gintis and colleages' (2001) evolutionary game theoretic model of punishment as a signal of individual quality is a notable
exception.
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[cooperation], positively relates to a society's level of trust and norms of coopera-
tion. (373-74).
Players' trust is key to making cooperation possible as players cooperate only insofar as they
expect their coplayers to cooperate too (Fischbacher et al., 2001). The more individuals trust
those they interact with, the more conﬁdent they are that defectors will be punished, which
reduces their expected payoﬀs to defection compared to the payoﬀs to cooperation.
Lastly, trust, cooperation and the eﬀective enforcement of norms can better be approached
as interrelated dimensions of social capital. While social capital has lent itself to a myriad
of uses and deﬁnitions since it became a commonplace concept in social sciences in the 1990s,
these three dimensions seem indeed to be largely agreed upon. Bowles and Gintis (2002,
in Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005: 1643), for instance, deﬁne social capital as referring to
trust. . . a willingness to live by the norms of one's community and to punish those who do
not. Ostrom (2000:176) adopts a similar deﬁnition: social capital is the shared knowledge,
understandings, norms, rules and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of
individuals bring to a recurrent activity (see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, for an extensive
review). In that respect, the model presented in this paper can be seen as the ﬁrst attempt
to formally integrate these three elements of social capital in a single framework.
4 Religion, Trust, and Cooperation
4.1 Religious Groups
This section addresses how certain institutions, such as religious groups, may arise endoge-
nously and raise trust and cooperation within a population. To address this question, I build
on the example of a religious group. This example ﬁts the features of the model particularly
well. First, religious groups are typically large-scale organisations in which members meet in-
frequently or not frequently enough for reputation-sensitivity. . . [to be] suﬃcient to explain
the features of strong prosocial tendencies (Norenzayan and Shariﬀ, 2008: 58)17. Second,
the enforcement of cooperation through emotion-based punishment (Stylized Facts A and B)
also ﬁts well the nature of religious groups. Indeed, religions encourage compliance with
codes of conduct and systems of beliefs that are conducive of cooperation through promises
17In fact, it is commonly viewed that religion may have evolved precisely to permit the rise of stable and large societies and
the prevalence of cooperation in ephemeral exchanges (see Bulbulia et al., 2008 for an extensive review).
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of supernatural sanctions and rewards (McBride and Richardson, 2012: 123). These super-
natural payoﬀs are used to support and strengthen material punishment and to construct
complex social systems in which cooperation is possible (Sosis, 2005: 19). Furthermore, the
very emotions involved in norms enforcement are reﬂected and made salient in the content
of religious rituals and practices. Indeed, in societies lacking a central political authority. . .
intense and negatively valenced religious rituals address the inherent free-rider problems of
collective action as they provide a reliable emotionally anchored mechanism for the sub-
ordination of immediate individual interest to cooperative group goals (Sosis and Alcorta
2004: 339). Incidentally, an almost universally recurrent characteristic of gods or supernatu-
ral beings is their propensity to feel angry and manifest their wrath in the face of disloyalty
and disobedience. Even though religious laws and codes of conduct often aim at controlling
anger as a potentially destructive force, anger directed at the upholding of social order is
often viewed as desirable and justiﬁed (Potegal and Novaco, 2010). Hence, religions groups
form a natural and intuitive application of the model.
4.2 The Model with a Religious Group
As discussed earlier, players face a coordination problem whenever a high equilibrium and a
low equilibrium coexist. The question is thus whether religion can operate as a mechanism
ensuring the realisation of the high equilibrium. To tackle this question, assume that without
religion, players coordinate on the low equilibrium. In other words, witout religion, players
have a utility of zero.18
Suppose that the two game stages introduced earlier are preceded by a primitive stage.
During this primitive stage, assume without loss of generality that a player, denoted player
L, can decide to form a religious group. She also decides of a non-negative cost of religious
requirements, denoted r, that any player choosing to become a member of L's religious
group has to bear. Hence, during this ﬁrst stage, all players choose a membership strategy
mi ∈ Mi = Mj = {M, N} ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1], where M and N stand for membership and
non-membership, respectively. Players choosing mi = M shall hereinafter be referred to
as members and players choosing mi = N , as seculars. As soon as one or more players
join L's religious group, all members pay the cost r and then restrict their second-stage
interactions to the in-group. Since players coordinate on the low equilibrium when there is
no religion, seculars have a reservation utility of 0. To study the equilibria of the modiﬁed
game, I adapt the deﬁnition of an equilibrium as follows.
18This assumption may also reﬂect the risk dominance of the low equilibrium over the high equilibrium. Coordination may
be increasingly risky and diﬃcult to achieve as societies grow, rendering no coordination equilibria more attracting.
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)] ≥ Ei [ui (m′i, s∗i, ˜s∗−i, p∗i , ˜p∗−i, qi, ˜q−i, τi)];
4. qi = q−i = Ei ( ˜q−i) = E−i (q˜i) = q∗;
where q∗ corresponds to the actual proportion of cooperators within the religious group.
Deﬁnition 3 is analogous to Deﬁnition 2 but states in addition that players' action strategy
in the second stage must maximise their expected utility conditional on players' membership
strategy. In turn, players' optimal membership strategy must be consistent with backward
induction.
4.3 Religion with Homogeneous Players
The question addressed now is whether a religious group, as described above, can enhance
trust and cooperation. To achieve higher cooperation, religion must somehow deter defection.
Let Πd (q) denote the expected utility from defection for a level of q when qi = Ei (qj) =
q, ∀i, j. Note that Πd (q) is represented by the curve of expected payoﬀs from defection on
Figure 1 and can be written at length as Πd (q) = q (pid − p∗ (q)). Suppose ﬁrst that players
are homogeneous, as in Section 3.1. Consider the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4. Denote by r∗ the minimum cost of religious requirements ensuring coordina-
tion, written as :
r∗ =
Πd (qˆ) if qˆ < q∗Πd (q∗) otherwise
with q˜, the proportion of cooperators at the intermediate equilibrium and q∗ = arg maxq {Πd (q)}.
Figure 3 (a) and (b) provide graphical illustrations of r∗when qˆ > q∗ and when qˆ < q∗,
respectively. The intuition as to why r∗ can achieve full cooperation is straightforward.
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Figure 3: Minimum Cost of Religious Requirements Ensuring Coordination
Suppose ﬁrst, as on Figure 3 (a), that qˆ > q∗. With a cost of religious requirements of
Πd (q
∗), a member clearly cannot achieve positive payoﬀs is she chooses to defect. Indeed,
defection can yield payoﬀs of at most Πd (q
∗). A player choosing membership and defection
would thus always be better oﬀ remaining secular. Ex ante, all players know that and can
thus infer that if they join the religious group, they will not be matched with a defector.
Second, suppose that qˆ < q∗. Then, the only way for a member to achieve net positive
expected payoﬀs by defecting is if she expects q > qˆ. However, as it is clear on Figure 3 (b),
if she expects q > qˆ, then she will strictly prefer to cooperate. Again, all players know that
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fact ex ante and will thus infer that once in the religious group, they will not be matched
with a defector.
Let us now go back to player L's decision of whether or not to form a religious group.
If she does so, clearly she won't choose a level of requirements diﬀerent than r∗. Indeed,
requirements cheaper than r∗ would not be suﬃcient to coordinate beliefs and ensure full
cooperation; the low equilibrium would be eﬀectively replaced by an equilibrium of full sec-
ularity, with no impact on players' ﬁnal payoﬀs. In contrast, requirements greater than r∗
would only be more costly without achieving anything more than r∗. Therefore, player L's
decision boils down to determining whether the beneﬁts of full cooperation are worth the
cost of the religious group born by each member, r∗. Hence the following proposition.
Proposition 2.
1. If and only if pic ≤ r∗, then no religious group arises endogenously within the population.
2. If and only ifpic > r
∗, then a religious group arises endogenously with membership cost r∗.
Full membership and full cooperation then constitute an equilibrium in weakly dominant
strategies.
Proposition 2 implies that if the beneﬁts to cooperation are high enough, then a religious
group with costly religious requirements will emerge endogenously and achieve the coordina-
tion of players' trust. This makes membership and cooperation an equilibrium in (weakly)
dominant strategies.19 If we assume that player L forms the religious group if she is indiﬀerent,
then secularity is strictly dominated for all players by membership followed by cooperation.
In that respect, religion arises endogenously whenever pic > r
∗.
4.4 Religion with Heterogeneous Players
Let us now turn our attention to the case where players are heterogeneous. Consider ﬁrst
the following amendment to Deﬁnition 4.
Deﬁnition 4*. Denote by rˆ∗ the minimum cost of religious requirements ensuring coordi-
nation with heterogeneous players, deﬁned as follows:
19Indeed, full non-membership is also an equilibrium, although weakly dominated by full membership and full cooperation.
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rˆ∗ =
Πd (qˆ) if ∃ qˆ < q∗ : Πc, q (q) > Πd (q) , ∀q ∈ (qˆ, 1]Πd (q∗) otherwise
with qˆ, the proportion of cooperators at any intermediate equilibrium and Πc, q (q), the expected
payoﬀs from cooperation for the qth player.
Deﬁnition 4* is a generalisation of Deﬁnition 4 to account for the possibility of interior stable
equilibria (i.e. where curve (iii) crosses curve (i) from above). Indeed, if there is such an
equilibrium qˆ with qˆ < q∗, then Πd (qˆ) is not suﬃcient to deter free-riders from entering
the group. This is only true for interior stable equilibria, which were not possible with
homogeneous players.
Proposition 2*.
1. If and only if pic ≤ rˆ∗, then no religious group arises endogenously within the population.
2. If and only if pic > rˆ∗, then a religious group arises endogenously with membership cost
r∗. Membership and cooperation constitute an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies
for all players with τi ≤ pic − rˆ∗, while non-membership is a strictly dominant strategy
for all players with τi > pic − rˆ∗.
Proposition 2*.1 mirrors Proposition 2.1. It states that if pic ≤ rˆ∗, then even the player the
most inclined towards cooperation ﬁnds the cost of religious requirements too high for the
beneﬁts achieved. In such case, no religious group emerges. In contrast, if pic > rˆ∗, then at
least some players ﬁnd the beneﬁts of a religious group to be greater than its cost. Recall
that when players are homogeneous, if group membership is proﬁtable to one player, then it
is for all (Proposition 2.2); this is however no longer the case with heterogeneity.
When players are heterogeneous, a religious group may thus play an additional signalling
role by excluding the least cooperative individuals. This signalling role can better be seen on
Figure 4, which presents a case where the only possible equilibrium without religious group
when players are heterogeneous is full defection. It is so because all players know that free-
riders always undermine the group to such an extent that cooperation is never a dominant
strategy for any player. In such case, rˆ∗ operates ﬁrst as an eﬀective signalling device. Only
players for whom cooperation is a dominant strategy when q = 1 (players at the left of q∗R)
are potentially willing to pay that cost, which de facto excludes the fraction 1−q∗R consisting
of the least cooperative players. Second, rˆ∗ operates as a coordination device in the same
way as with homogeneous players: the only rational reason for any player to bear the cost
23
Figure 4: The Signalling Role of Religion
rˆ∗ is if she expects a level of cooperation such that she is better oﬀ cooperating. This makes
full cooperation the only possible outcome within the religious group, which is proﬁtable for
any player i with τi ≤ pic − rˆ∗.
4.5 Discussion
The results of this section relate to those obtained in the literature on the economics of religion
addressing the role of religious organisations in fostering in-group cooperation. Theoretical
work in that ﬁeld has primarily built on signalling models (see e.g. Levy and Razin, 2012,
forthcoming; Berman, 2000; Iannacconne, 1992, 1994). Iannacconne (1992, 1994) famously
pioneered the application of signalling theory to religious organisations to explain how costly
religious requirements could increase contributions to a club good. In a seminal paper, he
(1992) showed that such organisations producing club goods could tie membership to costly
and easily recognisable signals in order to screen for and exclude potential free-riders. He
showed that if such signals are costly enough, then a religious organisation may be able to
retain only individuals with a relative advantage in the production of the club good, thereby
incerasing its quality and, in turn, the welfare of its members.
In a similar vein, Levy and Razin (2012, forthcoming) propose a model in which players
are randomly matched to play a symmetric PD game. In addition, players may join a
religious organisation. Members of the religious organisation bear the exogenously given cost
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of religious rituals and requirements. Religious participation also endows players with beliefs
about the probability of a utility shock, which can be either positive or negative. This utility
shock is exogenous and inﬂuences only players' ex ante expected utility (e.g. divine rewards
or punishments). A religious player perceives the probability of a negative shock when she
defects as higher than the probability of such shock when she cooperates. However, her
perception of the diﬀerence between these two probabilities depends on her type, which is
drawn from an exogenous random distribution. This type reﬂects a player's propensity to be
inﬂuenced by religious participation. In that setting, costly religious requirements function
as a signalling device as only the more easily inﬂuenced players partake in the religious group,
and these players are more inclined to cooperate due to their beliefs.20
The key proposition of signalling models of religion is that religious groups, through costly
religious requirements, achieve higher cooperation through the separation of diﬀerent types
of individuals. Indeed, these studies typically rely on the existence of two types of agents,
namely pious agents and defectors. As the former are assumed to be disposed to co-
operate naturally, costly signals ensure the exclusion of the latter to enhance cooperation
amongst the pious. This feature of signalling models is problematic for two reasons. First, it
assumes away the puzzle of cooperation for a fraction of the population, suggesting that re-
ligious beliefs are suﬃcient to account for cooperation. However, Bulbulia (2012:15) surveys
ample evidence that religious beliefs are neither necessary nor suﬃcient to assure [cooper-
ation]. Hence, what makes cooperation possible in the ﬁrst place cannot be explained by
signalling theory alone. Second, the hypothesis that beliefs per se induce cooperative be-
haviours overlooks the normative mechanisms underlying the enforcement of cooperation.
Humans' capacity to enforce cooperative norms through punishment is yet widely regarded
as crucial in the evolution and sustainability of cooperation throughout human history (see
Dubreuil, 2010a,b, for an extensive review of this argument). Consequently, signalling models
of religion have so far de facto ignored the interaction between religion, cooperative norms
and their enforcement.
20Note that in Levy and Razin's model, exogenous religious requirements have an impact on cooperation only insofar as
religion instils exogenous, prosocial beliefs in players. In my model, in contrast, both these requirements and players' beliefs are
endogenous. In particular, players' beliefs reﬂect players' expectations about their social environment, not about hypothetical
divine rewards and punishment. Even though the settings are similar, Levy and Razin's model tackles primarily the link between
religious beliefs and cooperation while I focus on the link between religious practice, social norms and enforcement of cooperation.
The models thus complement one another.
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The model introduced in this paper extends the signalling approach to religion. It ﬁrst
presents religious organisations as devices coordinating players' trust. In turn, trust rein-
forces the mechanisms of cooperation enforcement (punishment). Players heterogeneity is
not necessary for a religious organisation to fulﬁll this coordination role. Finally, when play-
ers are heterogeneous, a religious group may in addition serve as a signalling device to exclude
those who would never cooperate, which is in line with signalling models of religion. These
roles (coordination and signalling) are formalised in Propositions 2 and 2*.
A direct implication of these propositions is that ceteris paribus , costlier religious require-
ments should ensure the achievement of higher levels of in-group trust and cooperation.
Sosis (2000) and Sosis and Bressler (2003) provide evidence consistent with this implication
using data on secular and religious communes the XIXth century U.S.A. Since religion is ex-
cepted to increase cooperation, religious communes are expected to survive longer than their
non-religious counterparts. Sosis (2000) ﬁnds that religious communities were incidentally
signiﬁcantly more likely to outlast secular ones at every stage of their life (more than 4 times
more likely). Sosis and Bressler (2003) ﬁnd that religious communes demanded more than
twice as many costly requirements21 to their members compared to non-religious communes,
and that these requirements were signiﬁcantly and positively correlated to communes' lifes-
pan. These ﬁndings imply. . . that the greater longevity of religious communes with costlier
requirements [is] due to greater intragroup cooperation and trust levels (Norenzayan and
Shariﬀ, 2008: 61). This hypothesis is consistent with the model's implications.
Another implication of Propositions 2 and 2* is that members of religious groups should,
ceteris paribus , be more cooperative, trusting and trusted than non-members, at least with
coreligionists. Empirical evidence is consistent with this proposition.22 Indeed, religious indi-
viduals are persistently perceived to be more trustworthy and more cooperative by others,
and sociological surveys suggest that individuals who report stronger [religious] beliefs. . .
have stronger altruistic tendencies (Norenzayan and Shariﬀ, 2008: 59-60). Membership to
a religious organisation has been found to foster in-group trust between coreligionists (see
Sosis, 2004, for a review). Furthermore, participation in world religions has been found
to be signiﬁcantly correlated with increased cooperation in ultimatum games and dictator
games, and is also correlated with punishment in third-party punishment games (Henrich et
al., 2010). These ﬁndings altogether support the notion that religion may have coevolved
with complex societies to facilitate larger-scale interactions, notably through the fostering
21Deﬁned either as (i) behaviours required by the commune and entailing energetic, time and/or ﬁnancial cost; or (ii) as
restricted behaviours (e.g. alcohol consumption) (Sosis and Bressler, 2003: 219).
22Note that the model is silent with respect to how members would interact with secular players. Indeed, it rests on the
assumption that members restrict their interactions to the in-group. However, if we assume that members would act, or would
be more likely to act, with secular players as if they were at the in-group equilibrium, then this evidence is directly consistent
with the implications of the model.
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of trust and the enforcement of cooperative norms (Henrich et al., 2010: 1481). The model
is in direct line with these ﬁndings.
5 Application: Analysing the Size of Religion
5.1 Religion Participation and Aﬃliation
A useful feature of the model introduced in this paper is that it permits an analysis of the
factors inﬂuencing both religious aﬃliation, deﬁned as the proportion of players who partake
in the religious groups (q∗R), and religious participation, deﬁned as the costliness of religious
requirements and measured directly by rˆ∗, in a society.23 Proposition 3 formalises some of
the predictions stemming from the model in that regard.
Proposition 3.
Religious aﬃliation is decreasing in the material beneﬁts to defection, pid , and in the cost of
punishment ,24 c (p), and is increasing in the material beneﬁts to cooperation, pic. Religious
participation is decreasing in pic and increasing in pid and in c (p).
Proposition 3 proposes an integrated theory of the factors inﬂuencing the size of religion
within a society. Figure 5 is useful to understand the mechanisms underlying Proposition
3. First, an increase in pic pushes the expected payoﬀs from full cooperation curve up
and the expected payoﬀs from defection curve down, as shown on Figure 5 (a). As the
payoﬀs to cooperation increase, cooperators' negative emotions in the face of defection also
increase, which translates into higher punishment (and thus smaller net payoﬀs to defection).
The combined eﬀects of the shifting of these two curves results in an increase in religious









Second, an increase in pid shifts upwards the expected payoﬀs from defection curve, as









). An increase in
the cost of punishment would have a similar eﬀect as it would diminish cooperators' optimal
punishment, which in turn would shift upwards the expected payoﬀs from defection curve.
Aother implication of Proposition 3 is that religious aﬃliation and participation should be
inversely correlated. Indeed, ceteris paribus , an increase in religious participation always
entail a decrease in religious aﬃliation.25
23To simplify this analysis, I will restrict my attention without loss of intuition to the cases where, at equilibrium, some players
partake in the religious group while some others do not, that is whenever pic > rˆ∗ and pic − τmax < rˆ∗.
24By increasing cost of punishment, I mean that any level of punishment chosen by a player entails a greater total cost of
punishment. For instance, a technological improvement that would the change punishment cost function from c (p) = 5p to
c (p) = 2p would entail a decreasing cost of punishment.
25This is consistent with the empirical evidence showing that more demanding religious groups are typically: see e.g. Iannac-
conne, 1992. This result also echo that of Levy and Razin (2012), who ﬁnd that religious groups that are more demanding in
their rituals are smaller are composed of individuals who are more extreme in their beliefs.
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Figure 5: Religious Aﬃliation and Participation
5.2 Evidence
The model predicts ﬁrst that an increase in the material beneﬁts to defection, pid, will in-
crease religious participation. This implication reﬂects the phenomenon that in hard times,
individuals tend to increasingly turn to their religious community and increase their devotion:
In cases of extreme hardship, where common-pool resource problems abound and
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the threats of defection are high, the expectation is for the cost outlays to intensify
and to become more frequent. When the chips are down the religious will produce
more eﬀort and expend more resources proving their faith. (Bulbulia, 2004: 672)
In this regard, Chen (2010) provides empirical evidence from the Indonesian ﬁnancial crisis of
1996-97. He ﬁnds that religious participation, measured as participation in religious rituals
and Islamic school attendance for children, increased amongst most aﬀected households. He
interprets these ﬁndings as evidence that economic distress stimulates religious participation,
at least for certain households. Furthermore, the model also predicts that an increase in pid
will decrease religious aﬃliation. Hence, an increase in pid should entail a decrease in religious
participation for players who beneﬁt less from cooperation (i.e. those who are less exposed
to economic risks).26 This is consistent with Chen's ﬁndings that households that suﬀer less
economic distress signiﬁcantly decrease religious intensity (2010: 303).
Proposition 3 also states that religious participation and aﬃliation depend on the cost of
cooperative norms enforcement. When such cost is low, cooperation is relatively easy to en-
force, and high costs of religious requirements are not necessary to ensure players' trust and
cooperation (and vice-versa). Various elements can inﬂuence the cost of norm enforcement.
The emergence of the modern state, with the deployment of its institutional apparatus (e.g.
bureaucracy, eﬃcient police forces and justice systems), certainly lowered the cost of enforc-
ing cooperation. For example, if an individual violates one's property, it is clearly easier for
one to refer to the police than to carry justice oneself. The model predicts that the emer-
gence of such institutions should accompany a diminution in religious participation. This
proposition is consistent with the commonly held view of the phenomenon of secularization
as a dimension of modernization, observed over the past centuries and decades in many parts
of the world.27 Max Weber, one of the earliest theorists of the modern states, held such view,
here summarized by Habermas (1990: 2):
What Weber depicted was not only the secularisation of Western culture, but also
and especially the development of modern societies. . . marked by. . . the two
functionally intermeshing systems that had taken shape around the organisational
cores of the capitalist enterprise and the bureaucratic state apparatus. To the
26Indeed, Chen stresses the collective insurance dimension of the religious group for its members. Clearly, wealthier or less
exposed households can be viewed as having a higher τi as they certainly beneﬁt less from such collective scheme (in other
words: their beneﬁts to cooperation are lower than for other households).
27The concept of modernization certainly cannot be pinned down to the emergence of formal institutions of law enforcement.
Hence, it might be diﬃcult, if not impossible, to clearly isolate the eﬀect of these institutions on religious participation and
aﬃliation. I only report here the common view that both phenomena (decreasing religious participation and establishment of
formal institutions of law enforcement) are related, which is indeed consistent with the model. Also note that the model predicts
as well an increase in religious aﬃliation in that context. This prediction is consistent with evidence that American church
membership rates have risen throughout most of the past two centuries (Iannacconne, 1998: 1468) alongside modernization, at
least until recently. More empirical research should shed light on this relationship.
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degree that everyday life was aﬀected by this cultural and societal rationalisation,
traditional forms of life. . . were dissolved.
Intergroup mobility is another factor aﬀecting the cost of punishing free-riders. Indeed, when
residents have few constraints limiting their ability to transfer to another group, the threat
of punishment and social ostracism are less eﬀective free-rider deterrents (Sosis and Alcorta,
2004: 268). The model predicts that an increasing intergroup mobility will in turn increase
religious participation and decrease religious aﬃliation. This is consistent with Sosis and
Alcorta's (2004: 268) observation that costly in-group requirements [are] more prevalent
in communities characterized by. . . high intergroup mobility. It is thus not surprising to
observe that religious organisations have typically sought to restrict such mobility, either
through open conﬂict with their surroundings (McBride and Richardson, 2012) or through
stigmas limiting their members' capacity to interact with the out-group (Iannacconne, 1992).
Another implication of Proposition 3 is that an increase (decrease) in the material beneﬁts to
cooperation,pic, will increase (decrease) religious aﬃliation and decrease (increase) religious
participation. The development of social safety nets can be interpreted at least partially in
light of this prediction. Indeed, cooperation within a community often aims at ensuring
security for its members, notably in the face of uncertainty regarding the ability to meet
future needs for food, clothing, and shelter (Olson, 2011: 136; c.f. Norris and Inglehart,
2004; Chen, 2010). When such needs are addressed by formal safety nets, the beneﬁts of
community-based cooperation diminish. That said, the development of social safety nets can
also be interpreted as increasing players' outside option :28 indeed, secular players may see
their payoﬀs increase relatively to religious players' payoﬀs. Globally, the combined eﬀect of a
decrease in pic and of an increase in players' outside option would be ambiguous with respect
to religious participation (as a decrease in pic increases rˆ∗ while an increase in the outside
option has the opposite eﬀect), but would deﬁnitely entail a decrease in religious aﬃliation.
This prediction is consistent with the evidence that public safety net interventions can dilute
incentives to maintain. . . informal coping groups since with incomes thus smoothed, house-
holds may no longer have suﬃcient incentive to band with others to form private risk sharing
arrangements (Cox and Fafchamps, 2008: 3714-56). It is also strongly consistent with the
empirical evidence provided by Norris and Inglehart's (2004) cross-national and longitudinal
study of religion aﬃliation and belief. They show that religious aﬃliation declines with in-
creasing safety net coverage, measured by the involvement of the state in providing health,
disability and pension insurance. They ﬁnd, in contrast, that high levels of poverty, violence
and economic inequality foster religious aﬃliation, ceteris paribus (c.f. Olson, 2011).29
28In the model, this outside option is assumed for simplicity to be 0; it is however easy to relax this assumption and analyse
the eﬀect of an increase in the payoﬀs to secularity. Clearly, the curves on Figure 4 would remain unchanged; the proportion of
players partaking in the group would thus stay the same. However, the optimal cost of religious requirements would decrease by
an amount equal to the increase in the payoﬀs to non-membership. Indeed, recall that rˆ∗ must be equal to the payoﬀs defectors
renounce to by remaining secular. If secular players' payoﬀs increase, then the net cost of renunciation diminishes accordingly.
29The concomitant rise of the welfare state and the massive religious disaﬀection observed in the Western world in the second
half of the XXth century onwards, for example, can also be interpreted in that light.
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Finally, the model also proves useful to analysing the impact of the state's interventions in
religions markets. In particular, the state may seek to penalize or to encourage religious
participation. The model predicts in this regard that a subsidy to religious participation
will leave religious aﬃliation unaﬀected but will increase religious participation,30 while a
state penalty would have the opposite eﬀect. Berman (2000) found that state subsidies to
ultra-orthodox groups in Israel increased religious participation of young men. Similarly,
Barro and McCleary (2006) found that state regulation of religion lowers religious partici-
pation (McCleary, 2011: 18). Hence, the available empirical evidence is consistent with the
predictions of the model.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a novel view of the role of religion in fostering cooperation. It proposes a
game theoretic model of religion as an institution arising endogenously to coordinate players'
trust, which in turn assures the enforcement of cooperative norms. The model also shows
that when players are heterogeneous, notably with respect to the strength of their religious
beliefs, religion may also serve as a signalling device to exclude those who would never
cooperate. Finally, the model enables clear and tractable predictions about the levels of
religious aﬃliation and religious within a society.
Diﬀerent interesting extensions to the model should be considered for further research. For
example, work could be done to investigate the dynamic eﬀects of diﬀerent rules for updating
players' beliefs. This approach would shed light on the evolution of the size of religion
within a society and of the mechanisms underlying such evolution at a micro level. Second,
the model in its present form does not allow for more than one religious group. Relaxing this
assumption could give insight into inter-group behaviour.
7 Appendices
Proof to Proposition 1
Let Πd (q) (Πc (q)) denote the expected ﬁnal utility from defection (from cooperation) for a level of q when
qi = Ei (qj) = q, ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1]. An equilibrium obtains when Πd (q) = Πc (q), or in cases of a corner solution
when q = 1 and Πd (q) < Πc (q).
30To see why, consider Figure 4. Under the assumptions that a state subsidy would leave pic, pid and the cost of punishment
unchanged, the curves on Figure 4 would stay the same, leaving group aﬃliation unaﬀected. However, to remain an eﬃcient
free-riding deterrent and coordination mechanism, the cost of religious requirements would now have to take into account the
subsidy that members receive from the state. The optimal cost of religious requirements would thus increase from rˆ∗ to rˆ∗ + s,
where s would measure the size of the state subsidy. The reasoning for state penalties is analogous.
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Lemma 1: Πd (q) is concave in q, ∀q ∈ (0, 1). Proof: Let pid − p∗ (q) be rewritten as B. Then, Πd (q) =
qB. We know from equation ( 10) that p∗ (q) is strictly increasing and concave in q. Hence, ∂B∂q = − (p∗)′ (q) <
0, and ∂
2B
∂q2 = − (p∗)′′ (q) > 0. Hence, B is strictly decreasing and convex in q. Since q is naturally increasing
and linear in q, then necessarily qB is concave. 
Consider now the two following cases.
Case 1 : Πd (q) ≥ 0 ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
Case 2 : Πd (q) ≥ 0 ∀q ∈ [0, q¯], and < 0 ∀q ∈ (q¯, 1]
Since Πd (q) is concave ∀q ∈ (0, 1], Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive. I will now show separately, for each of these
two cases, that Proposition 1 must hold. Note ﬁrst that the proof to the existence of the low equilibrium is
trivial for both cases as Πc (0) = Πd (0) = 0 in both cases.
Case 1: Πd (q) ≥ 0 ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 2: If Case 1 holds, then Πc (q)is convex in q, ∀q ∈ (0, 1]. Proof: Note that Πc (q) can be
written at lenght as:
Πc (q) = qpic + (1− q) [−γqpic (pid − p∗ (q))− c [p∗ (q)]] (14)
The ﬁrst derivative of expression (14) can be written as:
∂Πc (q)
∂q
= pic + γpicq (pid − p∗ (q)) + c [p∗ (q)]
(1− q) [−γpic (pid − p∗ (q)) + γqpic (p∗)′ (q)− c′ (p) · (p∗)′ (q)] (15)
Using equation (10), equation (15) can be simpliﬁed as:
∂Πc (q)
∂q
= pic + γpicq (pid − p∗ (q)) + c [p∗ (q)] + (1− q) [−γpic (pid − p∗ (q))] (16)
Using equation (16), the second derivative of expression (14) can be written as:
∂2Πc (q)
∂q2
= 2γpic [pid − p∗ (q)] + (1− q)γpic · (p∗)′ (q) (17)
which is always strictly positive when Πd (q) ≥ 0, implying that Πc (q) is strictly convex on this domain. 
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, to prove Proposition 1 when Case 1 holds is straightforward.
Proof of pic < pid − p∗max ⇒ ∃ only one low equilibrium:
By contradiction, suppose that there exists at least one other equilibrium, denoted qˇ, with Πc (qˇ) = Πd (qˇ).
Since Πc (0) = Πd (0) = 0 and Π
′
d (0) > Π
′
c (0) > 0, it must be the case, from Lemmas 1 and 2, that
Πc (q) < Πd (q) ∀q ∈ (0, qˇ) and Πc (q) > Πd (q) ∀q ∈ (qˇ, 1), which contradicts that pic < pid − p∗max. ¸
Proof of pic < pid − p∗max ⇐ ∃ only one low equilibrium:
By contradiction, suppose that pic > pid − p∗max . Then, clearly q = 1 forms an equilibrium, which is a
contradiction. ¸
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Proof of pic > pid − p∗max ⇒ ∃ 3 equilibria:
The low and the high equilibria, in that case, are trivial. Also, since Πc (0) = Πd (0) = 0 and Π
′
d (0) >
Π′c (0) > 0 but Πc (1) > Πd (1) > 0, then given Lemmas 1 and 2 and the ﬁxed point theorem, ∃qˆ : Πc (qˆ) =
Πd (qˆ), with necessarily that Π
′
c (qˆ) > Π
′
d (qˆ) . Suppose that there is another equilibrium, denoted q¯, for
which Πc (q¯) = Πd (q¯). Suppose wlog that q¯ > qˆ. Then, it must be the case that for some q¨ ∈ (qˆ, q¯),
Π′c (q) > Π
′
d (q)∀q ∈ [qˆ, q¨] while Π′c (q) < Π′d (q)∀q ∈ [q¨, q¯], which contradicts either Lemma 1 or Lemma 2,
or both. ¸
Proof of pic > pid − p∗max ⇐ ∃ 3 equilibria:
By contradiction, suppose that there are 3 equilibria but pic ≤ pid − p∗max. Then, clearly, either Lemma 1
does not hold, or Lemma 2 does not hold, or neither hold, which is a contradiction. ¸
This completes the proof of Proposition 1 for Case 1.
Case 2: Πd (q) ≥ 0 ∀q ∈ [0, q¯], and < 0 ∀q ∈ (q¯, 1]
With Case 2, we know that Πc (1) > 0 > Πd (1). Hence, q = 1 is necessarily always an equilibrium. We
also know that Πc (0) = Πd (0) = 0 and Π
′
d (0) > Π
′
c (0) > 0. Also, we know that Πc (q¯) = pic > Πd (q¯) = 0.
Therefore, by the ﬁxed point theorem and as Lemmas 1 and 2 hold ∀q ∈ (0, q¯], there exists a unique
qˆ ∈ (0, q¯) : Πc (qˆ) = Πd (qˆ).
Proof of pic > pid − p∗max ⇒ ∃ 3 equilibria:
Suppose by contradiction that there are not 3 equilibria. Since we've already determined the necessary
existence of at least 3 equilibria (namely q = 0, q = 1 and q = qˆ), then there must be more than 3 equilibria
for this statement to hold. Suppose there is at least a fourth equilibrium, denoted qˇ. As Lemmas and 2 hold
∀q ∈ (0, q¯], it must be true that qˇ ∈ (q¯, 1], with Πc (qˇ) = Πd (qˇ). However, we know that Πc (q) > 0 ∀q ∈ (q¯, 1],
while Πd (q) < 0 ∀q ∈ (q¯, 1], which is a contradiction. ¸
Proof of pic > pid − p∗max ⇐ ∃ 3 equilibria:
Suppose by contradiction that there are 3 equilibria but pic ≤ pid − p∗max. By the deﬁnition of Case 2, this
condition can be rewritten pic ≤ pid − p∗max < 0, which is a contradiction. ¸
This completes the proof to Proposition 1. 
Proof to Proposition 1*
Note that equation (14) for the qth player can be rewritten as follows:
Πc (q) = qpic + (1− q) [−γqpic (pid − p∗ (q))− c [p∗ (q)]]− τq (18)
Where τq is the qth player's type. Knowing that τq = Φ
−1 (q) by deﬁnition, the ﬁrst derivative of expression
(18) can be written as follows after simpliﬁcation using equation (10):
∂Πc (q)
∂q
= pic + γpicq (pid − p∗ (q)) + c [p∗ (q)]




The second derivative of expression (18) can thus be written as:
∂2Πc (q)
∂q2




If Φ is weakly convex, then Φ−1 is weakly concave, entailing that equation (20) is always positive whenever
pid − p∗ (q) > 0. Hence, the proof to Proposition 1 (Case 1) applies here. Note that the Proof to Proposition
1 (Case 2) does not apply, however: if pid − p∗ (q) < 0 for some q, then Πc (q) is not necessarily convex
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∀q : pid − p∗ (q) < 0, entailing the possibility of an intermediate equilibrium with Πc (q) = Πd (q) < 0. Such
an equilibrium is not very interesting, however, as it implies that more cooperation is less desirable to some
players than no cooperation at all.
Finally, note that when Φ is not weakly convex, than the proof to Proposition 1 does not hold. Following the
proof to Proposition 1, the only things we can say in such a case is that (i) a low equilibrium always exists;
(ii) a high equilibrium exists whenever pic− τmax ≥ pid− p∗max; and (iii) if (ii) applies, then by the ﬁxed point
theorem, at least one intermediate equilibrium must also exist. 
Proof to Proposition 2
I'll consider the following two cases and prove Proposition 2 for these two cases separately.
Case 1: r∗ = Πd (qˆ)
Conditional on mi = M , then Πd (q) > 0 iff q > qˆ, for all players. By deﬁnition, ∀q > qˆ, we know that




i ) 6= (M, D). To see why, suppose by contradiction that a
player chooses mi = M and si = D. Then, if q ≤ qˆ, Πd (q)−r∗ ≤ 0, and m∗i 6= M as ui (., mi = M |si = D) <
ui (., mi = N |si = D). If q > qˆ, then s∗i 6= D as ui (., si = D|mi = M) < ui (., si = C|mi = M). Hence,
we know that (s∗i |mi = M) = C for all players. Then, the maximisation problem maxmi∈Mi ui
(




yields the unique solution mi = M iﬀ pic > r
∗, for all players.
Case 2: r∗ = Πd (q∗)
Conditional on mi = M , then Πd (q) < 0. Then, iﬀ pic > r
∗, for reasons analogous to those presented with
Case 1, it must be the case at equilibrium that (mi = M)⇒ (si = C), for all players. The rest of the proof
follows immidiately from the preceding case.
This completes the proof to Proposition 2. 
Proof to Proposition 2*
The Proof to Proposition 2* stems logically from the proof to Proposition 2. 
Proof to Proposition 3
Note that with the case pic > rˆ∗ > pic − τmax, we have necessarily from Deﬁnition 4 that rˆ∗ = Πd (q∗). To
see why, suppose by contradiction that rˆ∗ = Πd (qˆ), with qˆ < q∗ and Πc,q (q) > Πd (q) ∀q ∈ (qˆ, 1]. Then, it
follows necessarily that Πc,q (1) > Πd (1), which implies that rˆ∗ < pic − τmax, which is a contradiction.
We also know that the type of the member of the religious group with the highest type can be written as
τR = pic − rˆ∗. This member has a utility of zero. Furthermore, the level of religious aﬃliation qR can be
written as qR = Φ (τR) as all players with types lower than τR partake in the religious groups. Hence, religious




, with Φ′ (.) > 0.
To do comparative statics with these expressions is straightforward. First, we note that ∂rˆ
∗
∂pic
= −∂p∗(q)∂pic , which
is always negative (Remark 1). It follows immidiately that ∂qR∂pic = Φ
′ (pic − rˆ∗) · (1 + ∂p∗(q)∂pic ) > 0. Second,
∂rˆ∗
∂pid




< 0. An increase in the cost of punishment
has an eﬀect analytically similar to an increase in pid. 
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